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The attribution of personal traits to other persons depends on the actions the observer performs at the same time (Bach & Tipper,
2007). Here, we show that the eﬀect reﬂects a misattribution of appraisals of the observers’ own actions to the actions of others. We
exploited spatial compatibility eﬀects to manipulate how ﬂuently—how fast and how accurately—participants identiﬁed two individuals
performing sporty or academic actions. The traits attributed to each person in a subsequent rating task depended on the ﬂuency of par-
ticipants’ responses in a speciﬁc manner. An individual more ﬂuently identiﬁed while performing the academic action appeared more
academic and less sporty. An individual more ﬂuently identiﬁed while performing the sporty action appeared sportier. Thus, social per-
ception is—at least partially—embodied. The ease of our own responses can be misattributed to the actions of others, aﬀecting which
personal traits are attributed to them.
 2007 Elsevier Inc.
Keywords: Social perception; Trait attribution; Fluency; Embodiment; Cingulate cortex; Action observation
Open access under CC BY license. Humans constantly attribute personal traits to others.
One person may appear intellectual, but not interested in
sports, whereas another person may appear more inter-
ested in sporting pursuits than intellectual challenges.
These attribution processes are quick and automatic (Amb-
ady & Rosenthal, 1992; Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998;
McNeill & Burton, 2002) and rely mostly on salient charac-
teristics of the observed individuals: a person may be tall,
strong, and fast; he may play for the college football team
but is rarely seen in the library.
Recently, however, researchers have begun to argue that
social perception was not only based on readily apparent
third-person information, but also on a process of ‘simula-
tion’. Accordingly, people covertly imitate the bodily states
of others (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Prinz, 1997;
Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). These embodied person repre-
sentations could then be used to attribute intentions, emo-
tions, and personal traits to the persons observed. This is0022-1031 2007 Elsevier Inc.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.11.005
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: p.bach@bangor.ac.uk (P. Bach).
Open access under CC BY license. possible because people have intimate knowledge about
the speciﬁc internal states that would generate the bodily
states in themselves (e.g., Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey,
& Ruppert, 2003; for a critical evaluation see Jacob &
Jeannerod, 2005).
There is ample evidence that covert imitation takes place
in social interactions. Humans non-consciously and non-
strategically mimic the people they interact with (e.g.,
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Van Baaren, Holland, Kawaka-
mi, & van Knippenberg, 2004; for a review, see Niedenthal,
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Sim-
ilarly, it is known that observed actions prime similar
actions in the observer, even when task irrelevant (e.g.,
Bach, Peatﬁeld, & Tipper, 2007; Brass, Bekkering,
Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz, 2000). Analogous results come
from neuroimaging techniques. So-called ‘mirror neurons’
have been discovered in the macaque premotor cortex
(DiPellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti,
1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996) that ﬁre
both when the monkey performs a particular action
and when it observes the action being performed by a
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of the mimicry eﬀects because they reveal how viewed
actions can be matched directly to the actions an observer
can produce (for similar data in humans, see Gre`zes,
Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; Iacoboni et al., 1999).
In recent years, however, it has become clear that
embodiment eﬀects are not restricted to the representation
of the particular motor acts others perform but also involve
their attentional, somatosensory, and aﬀective responses.
Observers seem to mimic, for instance, other persons’ gaze
shifts (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007), the emotional
consequences of others’ pain (Morrison, Lloyd, Di Pelleg-
rino, & Roberts, 2004), and even high-level action control
processes evoked by the errors others make (Schuch & Tip-
per, 2007; Van Schie, Mars, Coles, & Bekkering, 2004).
Even though there is now ample evidence for automatic
covert mimicry processes, it remains unknown whether
these processes can form the basis of person judgments.
A critical test would be to investigate whether changes in
the bodily states of the observer can give rise to changes
in how other people are perceived. There are studies that
demonstrate the ‘projection’ (Freud, 1915/1953) of an
observer’s traits onto others. For instance, Kawada, Oet-
tingen, Gollwitzer, and Bargh (2004) showed that traits
such as competitiveness and belief in malleable intelligence
can become transferred from self to others, even when only
held implicitly. However, even though these studies demon-
strate that traits of an observer can become misattributed
to other persons, they say nothing about whether such
misattributions can be evoked directly by an observer’s
bodily experiences, as would be predicted if judgments of
others were based on a covert imitation of their bodily
states.
Recently, we have provided evidence for a very speciﬁc
eﬀect of action on social perception (Bach & Tipper,
2007). We asked participants to identify two actors—
‘George’ and ‘John’—by responding with either their ﬁnger
or their foot. Both actors were shown engaging in the
sporty action of kicking a soccer ball and the academic
action of typing on a computer keyboard. Thus, depending
on whether an actor had to be identiﬁed with the ﬁnger or
the foot, participants’ responses were either similar to the
actor’s sporty action and dissimilar to his academic action,
or vice versa. We investigated whether this similarity
aﬀected how ‘sporty’ and how ‘academic’ the two actors
were subsequently perceived to be.
The results of the identiﬁcation task replicated previous
research on imitative behavior as reviewed above, showing
that responses were faster and more accurate when they
were similar to the observed action. Interestingly, the ﬂu-
ency of participants’ responses also aﬀected how ‘sporty’
and how ‘academic’ the two actors were perceived to be.
An actor identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response was not only
identiﬁed more quickly and accurately while performing
the academic action of typing on a keyboard than the
sporty action of kicking the soccer ball, he was subse-
quently judged to be more academic and less sporty. Incontrast, an actor identiﬁed by a foot response was identi-
ﬁed more ﬂuently when kicking a soccer ball than when
typing on a keyboard. He was later perceived to be sportier
and less academic.
The ﬁnding that our actions aﬀect the personal traits we
attribute to other people demonstrates that social judg-
ments rely on representations in our own action system.
However, it is unresolved on which level these eﬀects occur.
There are two possibilities:
First, eﬀects may only emerge during the representation
of speciﬁc motor acts (e.g., kicking and typing actions). If
self-produced and observed motor acts activate overlap-
ping representations, any representation of an observed
action should be enhanced if the observer performs a sim-
ilar action, and disrupted if she/he performs a diﬀerent
action (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003). Such eﬀects have been
observed before (for a review, see Niedenthal et al.,
2005). For instance, people found a message more agree-
able if they nodded their heads while receiving it than when
they shook their heads (Wells & Petty, 1980), and inducing
smiles or frowns aﬀected how funny participants rated car-
toons they saw at the same time (Strack, Martin, & Step-
per, 1988). In a similar fashion, identifying an individual
with a ﬁnger response would, on the one hand, interfere
with the representation of the (dissimilar) kicking action
and make him appear less sporty. On the other hand, the
same ﬁnger response would enhance the representation of
his (similar) typing action so that the individual appears
more academic. This motor act hypothesis predicts that
the eﬀects on personal trait judgments emerged because
there were diﬀerent amounts of similarity between the
sporty and academic actions participants saw and the
responses they made at the same time.
Humans do, however, represent actions not only in
terms of the speciﬁc motor acts, but also evaluate actions
in terms of outcomes: whether they can be performed ﬂu-
ently, or whether they are associated with increased eﬀort,
pain or errors (for a review, see Botvinick, Cohen, & Car-
ter, 2004). Our personal-trait judgment eﬀects might there-
fore also reﬂect that participants misattributed such
appraisals of their own responses to the actions of the indi-
viduals. Recall that the similarity of the self-produced and
observed action was associated with fewer errors and a fas-
ter speed of the participants’ identiﬁcation responses. An
actor identiﬁed with a foot response might therefore have
appeared sportier because he was identiﬁed more ﬂuently
when he was seen in the sporty situation than when he
was seen in the academic situation. Conversely, the other
actor might have appeared more academic because he
was identiﬁed with a ﬁnger response more ﬂuently when
seen in the academic situation. This view predicts that the
similarity of one’s own responses and observed actions is
not critical. Rather, it is important that the participants’
responses diﬀer in degree of ﬂuency when actors are seen
performing the sporty and academic actions.
To test whether changes in response ﬂuency suﬃce to
induce changes in personal trait judgments we adapted
1084 S.P. Tipper, P. Bach / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 1082–1090our original paradigm (Bach & Tipper, 2007). We kept the
similarity of observed and self-produced actions constant,
and induced changes in response ﬂuency by exploiting spa-
tial compatibility eﬀects. In these spatial compatibility
eﬀects responses are faster and more accurate when they
occur on the same side as the eliciting stimulus (Simon,
Craft, & Small, 1971; Simon & Rudell, 1967). If the per-
sonal trait judgment eﬀects are due to the ease of partici-
pants’ responses being misattributed to the observed
actions then they should also occur in the present experi-
ment. If, however, the personal trait eﬀects require overlap-
ping representations of observed and self-produced motor
acts, eﬀects on personality judgments should not be
obtained.Experiment
In the experiment, participants made left and right ﬁn-
ger key presses to identify two actors (George and John)
that were presented either kicking a soccer ball or typing
on a keyboard. To do this, the participants had to orient
visual attention to the faces of the actors. Presenting this
critical stimulus feature either to the left or right side of
the screen allowed us to manipulate its spatial compatibil-
ity with the left or right keys used to identify the actors,
thereby inducing changes in response ﬂuency (the Simon
eﬀect; Simon & Rudell, 1967; Simon et al., 1971), withoutFig. 1. This ﬁgure shows the individuals to be identiﬁed, typical displays and t
of the display for the reader. It was not present in the stimulus displays.aﬀecting the similarity between observed actions and the
participants’ responses.
Assume, for instance, that for a given participant both
actors are always presented on the right when performing
the sporty action and on the left when performing the aca-
demic action (see Fig. 1). This creates a situation in which
the response to identify one of the two actors (e.g., the right
key press to identify John) will be spatially compatible, and
hence faster and more accurate, when he is seen in the
sporty context and incompatible, and hence slower and less
accurate, when seen in the academic context. Of course the
opposite pattern should be observed for the left key-presses
to identify George.
The critical question is whether induced diﬀerences in
response ﬂuency will translate into diﬀerences in personal
trait judgments. If the eﬀects on personal trait judgments
are due to a misattribution of action appraisals, then the
actors should take on the traits associated with the situa-
tion in which they are most ﬂuently identiﬁed. In the above
example, an actor should appear more academic when he is
identiﬁed with a left key because this response is spatially
compatible with the location of his face in the academic
scenes (‘George’ in Fig. 1). An actor should appear sportier
when he is identiﬁed with a right key because the right key
is spatially compatible with his position in the sporty scenes
(‘John’ in Fig. 1).
Note that any changes in personal trait judgments
induced in this way cannot be attributed to a similarityhe basic design. The dotted white vertical line is shown to depict the centre
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Each actor (George or John) is associated with a ﬁnger
key press response, as is each action (sporty and aca-
demic).1 Thus, if eﬀects on personal trait judgments require
that self-produced and observed actions converge on the
same representations (as assumed by the motor act hypoth-




Thirty-two students (27 females) ranging in age from 18
to 42 years participated in the study. All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The key assignment
of actors (George/John) to response keys (left/right) was
counterbalanced across participants, as was the side on
which the persons appeared in the scenes (left in the sporty
scenes and right in the academic scenes, or vice versa).
Thus, for one half of the participants, John was identiﬁed
with a compatible response when typing and George when
kicking, and vice versa for the other half of participants.
Participants satisﬁed all requirements in volunteer screen-
ing and gave informed consent approved by the School
of Psychology at the University of Wales, Bangor and
the North-West Wales Health Trust, and in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Material and apparatus
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room facing a
color monitor at a distance of 60 cm. The experiment was
controlled by Presentation run on a 3.0 GHz PC running
Windows XP. The stimulus set was identical to Experiment
1 of Bach and Tipper (2007). It consisted of eight movies
(see Fig. 1 for examples) lasting 1100 ms each and subtend-
ing eight degrees visual angle vertically and 11 degrees hor-
izontally. Two of these movies showed John or George
kicking a soccer ball, and two movies showed John or
George pressing a key on a computer keyboard. In these
four movies, the head of each actor appeared on the left
side of the frame centre (eccentricities: kicking: 1.1 degrees;
typing: 1.9 degrees). For each of these movies a mirror-
inverted version was created, in which the actor’s face
appeared on the right.1 Note that the stimuli also contained actions towards the left or right
that could, in principle, produce compatibility eﬀects with the side of the
response. However, to perform the identiﬁcation task, participants had to
orient their attention towards the faces of the actors. Since compatibility
eﬀects strongly depend on where attention is distributed on the display
(e.g., Bach et al., 2007), the side of the actors’ head should determine
compatibility eﬀects to a stronger extent than the direction of the
irrelevant action. Moreover, the direction of the action was always
opposite to the side of the individuals’ heads in the displays. Action based
compatibility should therefore, if anything, produce the opposite pattern
of results (in RTs, Error rates, and ratings) as the spatial compatibility
between head location and response keys.Procedure and design
After the computer-driven instructions and a short
training phase of 16 trials the experiment began. It lasted
for about 15 min and consisted of 320 trials. Each partici-
pant saw four of the eight movies, which were presented at
equal rates in a randomized order. Movies were selected in
the following way. For one participant, the two actors were
presented on the right while kicking and on the left while
typing. For another participant, the sides of presentation
were reversed between typing and kicking actions. This
ensured that for each participant, a right key-press to iden-
tify actor one was spatially compatible with only one of the
two situations in which he appeared (e.g., the sporty situa-
tion of kicking a football) and spatially incompatible with
the other situation (e.g., the academic situation of typing).
Conversely, the left key-press to identify actor two was spa-
tially compatible with the academic situation but not the
sporty situation.
Participants initiated each trial by pressing the space bar
with their left hand. After 500 ms the movie was presented.
Participants identiﬁed John or George by pressing either
the / or n keys on the computer keyboard with their left
or right index ﬁnger. Participants were instructed to iden-
tify the individual during the interval in which the movie
played (1100 ms). If their identiﬁcation was correct, the
next trial was allowed to start. If participants were too slow
or committed an error an error-message was displayed.
After the experiment was ﬁnished, a short questionnaire
consisting of four questions was presented on the computer
screen. Participants were presented with the name and face
image of one actor and asked to indicate on a scale from
4 (‘not at all’) to 4 (‘very much’’) how sporty they imag-
ined him to be. They also rated the degree to which they
thought him academic. They answered the same two ques-
tions with regard to the second actor. The order in which




RTs were entered into a repeated measures ANOVAs
with the within-subjects factors Observed Action (sporty/
academic) and Person (John/George) and the between-sub-
jects factor Compatibility (whether John is spatially compat-
ible when typing and George when kicking, or vice versa).
Trials in which participants were too slow or in which they
pressed a wrong button were excluded (4%). The analysis
revealed main eﬀects of Person (F[1,30] = 9.3, p < .005)
and Observed Action (F[1, 30] = 24.1, p < .0001). John was
generally identiﬁed faster thanGeorge, and the persons were
generally identiﬁed faster in the academic scenes, in which
the faces were larger/clearer. Most importantly, the pre-
dicted three-way interaction of Person, Observed Action
and Compatibility was highly signiﬁcant (F[1,30] = 21.3,
p < .0001). Thus, the RTs to identify the two persons in the
two situations depended onwhich personwas identiﬁedwith
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son was identiﬁed with a compatible response while kicking.
We further investigated whether this dependency on
compatible responses was present for both the sporty and
academic situations. A two-way ANOVA with the
within-subjects factors Person (John, George) and the
between-subjects factor Compatibility (whether John or
George is compatible while typing) computed for the RTs
in the academic scenes indeed revealed the critical two-
way interaction of Person and Compatibility (F[1, 30] =
9.8, p = .004), with responses being generally faster for
the person identiﬁed with a compatible response while typ-
ing. The reverse result was obtained for the analogous anal-
ysis of the sporty scenes (F[1, 30] = 13.0, p = .001), with
faster responses for the person identiﬁed with a compatible
response while kicking. See Table 1 for the RT data in all
conditions, and Fig. 2, top panel, for the data collapsed
across George and John.
Error rates were analyzed with the same ANOVA
model. There was a main eﬀect for Observed Action
(F[1,30] = 8.4, p = .007), that was further qualiﬁed by an
interaction of Observed Action and Person (F[1,30] = 7.2,
p = .011). The persons were more easily identiﬁed in the
academic scenes than the sporty scenes, and this advantage
was particularly found for the identiﬁcation of George. The
critical three-way interaction of Observed Action, Person,
and Compatibility was again signiﬁcant (F[1,30] = 18.8,
p = .0001). Again, the dependency on spatial compatibility
was present for both sporty (F[1,30] = 9.1, p = .005) and
academic scenes (F[1, 30] = 6.0, p = .021). Thus, in both
scenes, the participants made fewer errors when identifying
the person for which response side and head location were
compatible (see Fig. 2, middle panel, and Table 1).Personal-trait judgments
As in the RTs and Error rates, the rating data were
entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with the
within-subjects factors Trait (sporty/academic) and Person
(John/George) and the between-subjects factor Compati-
bility (whether John is spatially compatible when typing
and George when kicking, or vice versa). The results mir-Table 1
Results of the experiment in RTs, Error rates, and personal trait ratings for the
on whether George was always presented in a compatible manner while typin
George compatible when typing
John compatible when kicking
Sporty Academic
George John George Jo
RTs (ms) 600 564 563 57
SD 45 42 37 3
Errors (%) 5.9 2.9 1.9 4
SD (%) 4.4 2.5 1.6 3
Ratings 1.9 1.3 1.7 0
SD 1.0 1.1 0.6 1
Bold numbers indicate compatible responses.rored the original study (Bach & Tipper, 2007). Main
eﬀects of Trait (F[1,30] = 21.0, p < .0001) and Person
(F[1,30] = 25.6, p < .0001) reﬂected that overall, the per-
sons were judged more academic than sporty, and that
John received higher ratings than George. There was also
a Person by Trait interaction (F[1, 30] = 46.8, p < .0001)
indicating that the two persons were rated diﬀerently on
the two traits: John was judged sportier than George
(p < .0001), but George appeared more academic
(p < .0005).
Most importantly, as in the RTs and Error rates, there
was a three-way interaction of Person, Action, and Com-
patibility (F[1, 30] = 6.8, p < .014). Thus, the attribution of
personal traits to the two persons depended on which per-
son was identiﬁed with a spatially compatible response
while typing, and which person was identiﬁed with a com-
patible response while kicking. Two-way ANOVAs
showed again that this dependency on compatible
responses was present for both academic (F[1,30] = 4.4,
p = .044) and sporty judgments (F[1, 30] = 6.4, p = .017).
Although George was generally seen to be more academic
than John, this diﬀerence was reduced when John was
identiﬁed with a compatible response while typing. Con-
versely, although John was generally perceived sportier
than George, this diﬀerence was reduced when George
was identiﬁed with a compatible response while kicking.
Fig. 2, lower panel, shows the rating data collapsed across
John and George, and Table 1 shows the data in all
conditions.Mediational analysis
As a last step of our analysis, we performed a mediation
analysis to investigate whether our spatial compatibility
manipulation aﬀected trait judgment directly or by induc-
ing changes in response ﬂuency during person identiﬁca-
tion. To this end, we derived single measures for (a) the
spatial compatibility manipulation, (b) the resulting com-
patibility eﬀects in the RTs and Error rates, and (c) the
compatibility eﬀects in the personal trait judgments. The
measure for the spatial compatibility manipulation was
derived by setting the value to 1 for the participants fortwo persons (George, John) and both scenes (academic, sporty), depending
g and John while kicking, or vice versa
John compatible when typing
George compatible when kicking
Sporty Academic
hn George John George John
3 573 576 568 547
8 75 67 63 62
.4 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.4
.1 4.5 3.6 3.5 2.0
.1 0.5 1.3 1.4 0.8
.1 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.2
Fig. 2. Results. The upper two panels show the spatial compatibility
eﬀects for RTs (upper panel) and Error rates (middle panel) in the
identiﬁcation task, collapsed across the two persons (John and George).
The lower panel shows the results of the personal trait judgment task.
Error bars show the standard error of the means.
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kicking, and to 1 for the participants with the reverse
assignment. The measure for the compatibility eﬀects in
RTs, Error rates and trait judgments were calculated by
subtracting the mean of the sporty John and academic
George responses from the mean of academic John and
sporty George responses. The ﬁrst group of participants
should therefore show positive compatibility eﬀects,
whereas the second group should show negative eﬀects.
Correlational analyses revealed ﬁrst that, as shown in
the main analysis, spatial compatibility was correlated with
trait judgments eﬀects (r = .43, p = .014) and with the ﬂu-
ency eﬀects in the identiﬁcation task (RTs, r = .64,p < .001; Errors, r = .62, p < .001). Consistent with our
mediational hypothesis, the ﬂuency eﬀects in the identiﬁca-
tion task were in turn positively correlated with subsequent
trait judgment eﬀects, though this relationship was only
signiﬁcant for the Error rates (r = .45, p = .01) but not
for the RTs (r = .22, p = .23).
The critical test for mediation is whether controlling for
the eﬀects of the mediator variables (i.e., the ﬂuency eﬀects)
signiﬁcantly reduces the relationship between spatial com-
patibility and trait judgments (i.e., the Sobel test; Sobel,
1982; for a review see Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The data
were therefore entered into a multiple mediator regression
analysis (for details, see Preacher & Hayes, in review) that
uses the ﬂuency eﬀects in both RTs and Error rates as
potential mediator variables, so that the unique eﬀect of
each variable could be captured while the other variable
was controlled (e.g., Preacher & Hayes, in review; Shrout
& Bolger, 2002). This analysis indeed revealed a marginally
signiﬁcant mediation eﬀect for the ﬂuency eﬀect in the
Error rates (z = 1.9; p < .07), but not for the eﬀect in
RTs (z = 1.4; p = .17). Thus, the mediational analysis
conﬁrms that our spatial compatibility manipulation
aﬀected trait judgments not directly, but at least partially
by inducing ﬂuency eﬀects in the Error rates during person
identiﬁcation.
Discussion
The present study replicated the vision-action personal-
ity eﬀect demonstrated by Bach and Tipper (2007). As in
the previous study, the actions of the observer inﬂuenced
which personal traits she attributed to individuals she
watched at the same time. As such, social perception
appears to be at least partially grounded in the system that
we use to perform and to represent the outcomes of our
own actions (Bach & Tipper, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2005).
Our new results also provide insights into the level of
action representation at which the eﬀects occurred. They
point towards a misattribution of high-level appraisals of
one’s own actions to the actions of others. We manipulated
the ﬂuency of the participants’ responses by varying the
spatial compatibility of the response keys (left/right) and
the position of the actor’s face in the scenes (left/right).
These variations in response ﬂuency were suﬃcient to inﬂu-
ence personal trait judgments. Actors were judged sportier
when they were identiﬁed more ﬂuently while performing
the sporty action. They were judged more academic when
they were more ﬂuently identiﬁed while performing the
academic action.
The critical role of ﬂuency in aﬀecting personal trait
judgments was further conﬁrmed by a mediational analy-
sis. It showed that our spatial compatibility manipulation
did not inﬂuence subsequent personal trait judgments
directly, but speciﬁcally because it evoked changes in the
ﬂuency of the responses. As in the previous study (Bach
& Tipper, 2007), this relationship between ﬂuent responses
and subsequent trait judgment eﬀects was speciﬁcally
1088 S.P. Tipper, P. Bach / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 1082–1090found for the Error rates, for which ﬂuency changes were
very salient due to error feedback, but not for the more
subtle changes in response speed.
These observations are not consistent with our prior
assumption (Bach & Tipper, 2007). We had assumed that
the judgment eﬀects occurred because observed and self-
produced motor acts converged on the same representa-
tions in the so-called ‘mirror’ areas of the brain. One
person might, for instance, have appeared sportier because
the representation of his kicking action was enhanced if the
observer performed a (similar) foot action, and disrupted if
he performed a (dissimilar) hand action. Although such a
process could take place, it cannot explain the present
results. Personal trait judgment eﬀects were evoked even
though there was no diﬀerential amount of similarly
between the participants’ left and right responses and the
sporty and academic actions. Our new results therefore
indicate that the eﬀects occurred on a higher level of action
representation, reﬂecting a misattribution of appraisals of
the observer’s own actions to the actions of others. In
particular, they indicate that ﬂuency appraisals of the
observer’s own actions might become misattributed to the
actions of others and aﬀect how they are perceived.
Similar eﬀects of ﬂuency on judgments have been
observed before. A robust ﬁnding is that stimuli that are
more ﬂuently identiﬁed also appear more aesthetically
pleasing (for a review, see Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman,
2004). However, our results go beyond these ﬁndings in
several respects. First, whereas in previous studies ﬂuency
was a consequence of the perceptual properties of the
viewed stimuli such as contrast or presentation time, it
was now manipulated by aﬀecting the overt motor behav-
ior of the participants (i.e., the speed and accuracy of their
identiﬁcation responses). Second, previously observed
changes in attitude to objects were typically very general,
aﬀecting global attributes such as liking or beauty. In con-
trast, the present manipulation induced speciﬁc changes in
attitude and enhanced certain traits of the observed per-
sons but not others (i.e., a person appears more sporty
but less academic, or vice versa). And third, to our knowl-
edge, this is the ﬁrst study that used a motor ﬂuency manip-
ulation to successfully induce changes in the attitude
towards other people, as opposed to abstract stimuli or
objects.
Our new ﬁndings may serve to link current ideas from
social psychology to research on clinical populations. A
failure to diﬀerentiate self from other is increasingly rec-
ognized as a hallmark of various clinical syndromes. For
instance, autistic individuals exhibit a number of behav-
iors that suggest a failure to distinguish self and other,
such as echolalia and echopraxia, diﬃculties in theory
of mind tasks, and the confusion of the pronouns ‘‘I’’
and ‘‘You’’ (cf. Rogers & Pennington, 1991; Russell &
Jarrold, 1999). Similarly, in schizophrenia the inner
speech of the suﬀerers might become misattributed to
other, often malevolent, individuals (cf. Frith, Rees, &
Friston, 1998). Our study shows that such misattribu-tions are not restricted to clinical populations but also
take place in the general population, though of course
to a less extreme extent.
The diﬀerences between our study and previous
reports of ﬂuency aﬀecting stimulus judgments also raise
the question about which mechanism drives the eﬀect,
and about exactly what becomes misattributed. Prior
research on ﬂuency suggests that the eﬀects occur on
the level of aﬀective responses (for a review, see Reber
et al., 2004). For instance, Monahan, Murphy, and
Zajonc (2000) showed that presenting stimuli repeatedly
leads to a general enhancement of positive aﬀect that,
in turn, can aﬀect the judgment of even unrelated stim-
uli. Similarly, the ﬂuent identiﬁcation of one individual
(e.g., John) in one of the situations (e.g., sporty) might
have evoked positive aﬀective responses, which in turn
inﬂuenced how the individuals were perceived. It could
therefore be that aﬀective responses are at the core of
a general mechanism that aﬀects appraisal processes,
inﬂuencing judgments of one’s own actions, the actions
of others, and even of non-animate objects in the
environment.
A second possibility is that the personal trait judg-
ment eﬀects reﬂect the misattribution of the ﬂuency expe-
riences themselves, regardless of aﬀective consequences of
the ﬂuent responses. This idea relies on the assumption
that people constantly evaluate their own actions and
that these evaluations can ‘spill over’ to the actions of
others, thereby aﬀecting trait attributions based on these
actions. Judgment eﬀects that originate from evaluations
of the observer’s own actions are not unknown in social
psychology. Higgins has introduced the notion of ‘value
from ﬁt’ (e.g., Higgins, 2000). If an action is appropriate
to an internal state, this creates a feeling of ‘rightness’
that can transfer to unrelated stimuli and make them
appear more valuable. Interestingly, this eﬀect has been
shown to be independent of mediating aﬀective factors
(Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003). We
propose that the ﬂuency experiences evoked by spatially
compatible responses might similarly be transferred to
the observed individuals and let their actions appear
more ﬂuent.
Recent ﬁndings from neuroimaging studies are consis-
tent with such a view. Areas in the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) have been shown to evaluate the outcome
of actions with regard to eﬀort, pain, errors, or the pres-
ence of response conﬂict (for a review, see Botvinick
et al., 2004). Intriguingly, it has recently become clear
that the ACC has mirror properties, that is, it represents
these properties for own and others’ actions alike (Mor-
rison et al., 2004; Van Schie et al., 2004; Schuch & Tip-
per, 2007). This overlap in the neuronal representations
of the evaluation of one’s own and other’s actions, such
as eﬀort, errors or conﬂict, is diﬀerent from the speciﬁc
motor processes simulated when observing another’s
action, such as whether a hand or foot is used, assumed
by the mirror neuron theorists.
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Humans attribute personal traits to others on the basis
of action representations that code for both the observer’s
own actions and the actions of others. However, the critical
overlap between self and other did not exist on the level of
the speciﬁc motor acts that were performed. Rather, the
present results indicate that the outcomes or appraisals of
one’s own actions were misattributed to the actions of oth-
ers. These ﬁndings are consistent with embodied accounts
of social perception that do not restrict mirroring to the
level of motor representations, but that assume that all
aspects of another person’s state can be represented as if
they were one’s own, including high level evaluative and
aﬀective responses.
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